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Abstract
We exploit variation in the design of sub-national health care financing ini-
tiatives in Indonesian districts to assess the effects of these local schemes on
maternal care from 2004 to 2010. The analysis is based on a district pseudo-
panel, combining data from a unique survey among District Health Offices with
the Indonesian Demographic and Health Surveys, the national socioeconomic
household surveys and the village census. Our results show that these district
schemes contribute to an increase in antenatal care visits and the probability
of receiving basic recommended antenatal care services for households that are
not targeted by the national health insurance programs. We observe a decrease
in home births. However, there is no effect on professional assistance at birth.
We also observe variation in scheme design across districts as well as constraints
to the effectiveness of local schemes. Including antenatal and delivery services
explicitly in benefit packages and contracting local rather than national health
care providers increases the effects on maternal care. Increasing population
coverage reduces effectiveness, delineating limitations to local funding and risk
pooling. Furthermore, we do not find any effects for districts outside Java and
Bali, where access to basic health care remains a key policy concern.
Key words: Health Care Financing, Decentralization, Maternal Health Care,
Indonesia.
JEL codes: I13, I18.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, a large number of local health care financing schemes im-
plemented and operated by district governments came into being in Indonesia.
These schemes collectively known as Jamkesda (Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah
– Regional Health Insurance), have been driven by two policy reforms imple-
mented in the early 2000s. Indonesia’s far reaching decentralization reforms
in 2001 granted district governments larger fiscal and political autonomy also
transferring a large part of public service delivery to district governments. In
2005, the national government introduced subsidized social health insurance for
the poor as a first step towards universal health coverage (UHC). The social
health insurance however still left many households without coverage, particu-
larly those in the informal sector, that fall outside the poorest segment. It is in
response to this coverage gap that many district governments, exercising their
relative autonomy introduced local health care financing schemes. However, de-
spite the common motivation and institutional context the schemes vary greatly
in scope and design (Gani et al. 2008, 2009; Sparrow et al. 2016).
At the time when many of the Jamkesda schemes were introduced, ma-
ternal health was and still remains a key policy concern in Indonesia. In the
past decade maternal mortality has remained stubbornly above 200 per 100,000
births, which is twice as high as the MDG target that the country had and also
represents one of the highest maternal mortality rates in Southeast Asia. Sim-
ilarly, neonatal mortality has remained high at 19 per 1,000 births. The high
maternal and neonatal mortality is generally attributed to the lack of skilled
attendance at birth, inadequate referrals to health care facilities and the qual-
ity of antenatal care (ANC) services (e.g. Achadi et al. 2014). Most of the
neonatal and maternal deaths however are preventable (UNICEF 2012). Stud-
ies, for example, estimate that about 20-30 percent of maternal deaths can be
prevented with appropriate care during pregnancy (Ekman et al. 2008). In
3
Indonesia, neonatal mortality is estimated to be about five times higher for
children who do not receive antenatal care than children benefiting from these
services (UNICEF 2012).
Maternal health is a world wide concern. Internationally, countries have
experimented with different mechanisms (e.g. subsidies1, vouchers2 and con-
ditional cash transfers (CCTs)3) to improve access and use of maternal health
care services, though, with ambiguous results (see Broghi et al. 2006; Kruk et
al. 2007; Comfort et al. 2013; Dzakpasu et al. 2014; Glassman et al. 2013;
Mohanan et al. 2016; For a systematic review see Murray et al. 2014). A few
studies have also looked at the effect of insurance on the utilization of mater-
nal health services.4 Mensah et al. (2010) assess the effects of the national
health insurance scheme in Ghana, while Long et al. (2010) study the New
Co-operative Medical System in China. Both these cross-section based stud-
ies document improved access to maternal health care which they attribute to
insurance. In Ghana, for example, Mensah et al. (2010) find that health in-
surance leads to an increase in the likelihood of using antenatal care by 13 to
15 percentage points; an increase in facility based deliveries by 12 to 18 per-
centage points, and an increase in births assisted by a trained professional by
14 percentage points. While the authors note less complications during births,
they do not find substantial improvements in the quality of antenatal care ser-
vices used, i.e. on blood and urine testing. In China, Long et al. (2010) find
increases in antenatal care and an increase in facility based deliveries from 45
to 80 percent. In a follow-up study the authors argue that health insurance
coverage may also facilitate the overuse of non-medical caesarian sections with
insured women being 1.3 times more likely to have a caesarian (Long et al.
1See e.g. De Allegri et al. (2012).
2See e.g. Ahmed and Khan 2011; Bellows et al. 2011; Obare et al. 2013; Van de Poel et
al. 2014.
3See e.g. Lim et al. 2010; Lin and Shah Salehi 2013; Powell-Jackson and Hanson 2012.
4So far, studies that have investigated the effect of insurance on the utilization of ma-
ternal health services specifically are scarce and do not establish a causal relationship (for a
systematic review see Comfort et al. 2013).
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2012).
Large scale insurance schemes as in Ghana and China are still rare in devel-
oping countries. In many countries health insurance schemes remain fragmented
and often operate only at a community level (Lagomarsino et al. 2012). The
advantage of community or regional schemes which operate at a decentralized
level is that they are arguably much closer to the target population and there-
fore also better positioned to respond to the needs of the population (see e.g.
Skoufias et al. 2011). Conversely, local schemes may suffer from a lack of finan-
cial and human resources, and limited administrative capacity and technical
expertise. So far, however, there is little empirical evidence on the performance
of decentralized insurance schemes particularly with respect to maternal and
child health care. The current policy context in Indonesia thus offers a unique
opportunity to study the effects of such decentralized schemes.
There are several channels through which local health care financing schemes
may affect maternal care: First, there is likely to be a direct effect on access
to antenatal care and delivery assistance if these services are explicitly covered
in the local schemes’ benefit packages, reducing the financial barrier to these
services. Second, there could be indirect effects of the Jamkesda on maternal
health care even when antenatal care and delivery services are not directly
covered by these schemes. For example, the effect could run through increased
exposure to health care providers due to greater use of other services covered
by the insurance, thereby improving awareness and trust, and leading to a
reallocation of health budgets at the household level to maternal care. The
reimbursement mechanism used for the health care service providers could lead
to a quality or supply impulse at facility level, for example, when health care
service providers might have a greater chance of being reimbursed. Finally,
the introduction of the Jamkesda schemes could be accompanied by higher
investments in the local health infrastructure at the district level and facilitate
access through better health infrastructure.
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In this paper we provide evidence on the first mechanism outlined, as well
as indicative evidence on improvements in the quality of services (fourth mech-
anism mentioned). More specifically, this paper investigates the effectiveness
of the Jamkesda health care financing schemes in improving access to mater-
nal health care services. The Jamkesda schemes have common political and
institutional origins. Nevertheless, they are independent initiatives by district
governments and a result of their autonomy based on Indonesia’s decentral-
ization law. As a result, the Jamkesda schemes vary greatly in their design.
Therefore, we first concentrate on the average effects of these schemes before
investigating the heterogeneity in the design of these schemes.
The paper contributes to the scant literature on the effects of health care
financing and access to maternal care. First, the available data allow us to
employ a more robust identification strategy and control for unobserved het-
erogeneity. Second, the detailed information on the local policy design provides
an opportunity to assess the channels through which service delivery is affected.
Finally, this is one of the few studies that also investigates differences in institu-
tional and policy design within a single country context (see e.g. Faguet 2004;
Akin et al. 2007; Galiani et al. 2008).
The study combines data from a unique survey of District Health Offices
(DHOs) – which are responsible for the implementation of the district health
policies – with the Indonesian Demographic and Health Surveys (IDHS) from
2007 and 2012, the annual Indonesian Socio-economic Survey (SUSENAS), and
the Village Infrastructure Survey (PODES). The DHO survey provides detailed
information on the design of the local schemes, such as the year of implementa-
tion, benefits package, premiums and co-payments, institutional arrangements,
management and provider contracting. Our identification strategy exploits vari-
ation in local health financing reforms across districts and year of birth of chil-
dren under 5 years of age. Using district-level fixed effects specifications, we
find that local health care financing initiatives increase antenatal care visits for
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households that are not targeted by the national (subsidized) health insurance
programs. Improvements in antenatal care are also observed in terms of the
depth of antenatal services provided. The variation in design features of the
schemes appears to be a source of impact heterogeneity. The observed positive
effects of local health care financing schemes is driven by those schemes that
explicitly include antenatal care in the benefit package. Finally, our results also
point to constraints of the local schemes. We find no effects on the number of
births attended by a trained professional, and we do not find any effects for
remoter districts where concerns about access to basic health care are most
prominent. Furthermore, contracting providers outside provincial and national
health care providers, and increasing population coverage, reduces the impacts
on maternal care, presumably by spreading limited local resources too thinly.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief background on the policy context. Section 3 presents the data and key
variables. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy. The results are discussed
in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Context
While social health insurance has been established in Indonesia for decades, this
has been exclusively available to the formal sector, i.e. the public service, mil-
itary and police, and the formal private sector. Prior to 2005 the main health
care financing policy instrument for the poor was the Health Card program
(a remnant from the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis social safety net) that pro-
vided targeted health care fee waivers at public providers to about 10 percent
of the population. In 2005 the Askeskin (Asuransi Kesehatan untuk Keluarga
Miskin – Health Insurance for Poor Families) program was introduced, as a
first step towards a long term objective of universal health insurance coverage
in Indonesia (Sparrow et al., 2013). In 2008 the program was expanded under
7
the name Jamkesmas (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat – Public Health Insur-
ance) to cover not only the poor but also the near poor. Households enrolled in
these programs were entitled to a comprehensive health care package at pub-
lic and selected private providers, with the premiums fully subsidized by the
government.
About 10 to 15 percent of the population in Indonesia were covered by for-
mal sector health insurance schemes. The Askeskin and Jamkesmas reforms
expanded insurance coverage by a further 30 percent and thus nearly 45 per-
cent of the population was covered by national health insurance schemes. The
reforms, however, still excluded a large part of the population in the infor-
mal sector. These households were not considered sufficiently destitute to be
targeted for the subsidized insurance, while also having no access to formal
sector social health insurance or private insurance. Many district governments
acknowledged this coverage gap of the national schemes and responded by es-
tablishing local health care financing schemes – the Jamkesda – to particularly
target those left out.
The local health care financing schemes were not only motivated by existing
coverage gaps; many were also driven by political opportunity (Aspinal, 2014).
With the introduction of direct elections for district regents (rural districts)
and mayors (municipalities) in 2005, free health care became a prominent fea-
ture in election campaigning. As a consequence, the number of local health
care financing schemes increased significantly after 2005 when the first district
elections were held.
The Jamkesda schemes were similar in that they are financed out of district
government budgets (often with support from the province). Furthermore, the
schemes were typically set up as a social insurance program following the na-
tional Jamkesmas model with the district fully subsidizing the premiums. For
about 30 percent of the Jamkesda management and administration was out-
sourced to the national insurance carrier PT Askes or an external party, but
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most were managed by the DHOs or implementation agencies set up by the
district governments. Despite these common features, there are also a number
of differences in the scope of these schemes, for example, the benefits that are
covered by the schemes, the health care providers contracted, and the legal en-
dorsement (for further details see Sparrow et al. (2016), and section 3.1 of this
paper).
As of January 1st, 2014, the Jamkesmas program and the formal sector so-
cial health insurance schemes have been consolidated in a new national health
insurance (Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN)). The new national scheme
combines the beneficiaries of the former Jamkesmas and the formal sector
programmes, with the objective of reaching universal coverage by 2019. In
the first two years, however, progress with voluntary enrolment for the non-
subsidized informal sector has been slow and subject to adverse selection (Sato
and Damayanti 2015). Currently it remains unclear if and how the existing lo-
cal health insurance schemes will be incorporated into the new national policy
by 2019.
3 Data
3.1 Data Sources
For the empirical analysis we construct a district pseudo-panel for the period
2004-2010 combining data from 4 sources: (i) a unique survey conducted among
District Health Offices (ii) the IDHS for 2007 and 2012, (iii) the SUSENAS for
2003-2009, and (iv) the PODES for 2003, 2006 and 2008.
The DHO survey was conducted through a combination of mail question-
naires and phone interviews with DHOs from December 2011 to April 2012. The
DHOs are responsible for the implementation of the health policies of district
governments, which include the Jamkesda schemes. The survey collected de-
tailed information on these local schemes, including timing of implementation,
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benefit packages, intended beneficiaries and coverage, funding source, health
service providers contracted and institutional design (legal endorsement and
management).5
Out of a total of 442 districts that were contacted, 262 districts responded
(60 percent).6 Figure 1 shows the geographic spread of the districts and their
status in the DHO survey. Red areas are districts which were not contacted
due to missing contact details. Yellow areas are districts which were contacted
but did not respond. The blue and green areas are districts which responded
to the survey. Green areas are districts which were not running a local health
care financing scheme at the time of the survey. The districts that responded
cover approximately 58 percent of the Indonesian population in 2010. The non-
response rate is a cause of concern with regard to sample selection bias and the
generalizability of the district survey. However, consistent with Sparrow et al.
(2016), and as will be discussed later, we find no evidence of sample selection
bias affecting our estimation results (see Section 4 for details).
The IDHS is a nationally representative survey that provides detailed in-
formation on households, individual health behaviour and other characteristics.
The main survey respondents are women aged 15-49. For the analysis we rely
on information gathered on children aged between 0 and 5 years of age. Due to
the random sampling process of the IDHS data not all districts are represented
in each survey wave. Combined, the two IDHS surveys sampled children from
234 of the 262 districts that responded to the DHO Survey.
The SUSENAS is a socio-economic survey conducted annually among a
cross-section of approximately 200,000 households. The survey is representative
at the district level and includes basic information on health care but is less
detailed than the IDHS. For the purpose of our analysis, we use the SUSENAS
to obtain information on the average health insurance coverage rates in districts.
5For a detailed description of the survey see Sparrow et al. (2016).
6Indonesia was made up of 497 districts at the time the DHO survey was conducted. 55
districts could not be contacted for the DHO survey because no contact details could be
obtained for these districts.
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The PODES village census is conducted every two to three years and provides
information on all rural villages and urban precincts in Indonesia, including
details on infrastructure and availability of health care providers.
We merge the data from the DHO Survey with the pooled IDHS survey data
based on a district identifier. Additional information on district characteristics
and infrastructure are obtained from the SUSENAS and PODES, which have
been collapsed to the district level.
The children included in our sample are aged between 0 and 5 years of age at
the time of the survey (i.e. 2007 or 2012 respectively). The years of birth that
we are considering for analysis range from 2004 to 2010. In total we have 10,856
child-observations spread over 234 districts and two survey years. The combined
data allows us to match the year of birth of the children to the presence and
design characteristics of a Jamkesda scheme in that specific year. That is, the
data constitutes a district pseudo-panel with variation in outcome variables
and Jamkesda policy by year of birth and district. Due to inconsistencies in
the SUSENAS questionnaires, we can get a complete set of consistent control
variables only for children with year of birth from 2004 onward. The period
under study ends in 2010 because of the introduction of the Jampersal (Jaminan
Persalinan – Universal Delivery Care) program in 2011. This program provides
free delivery assistance as well as free ante- and postnatal services for women
that are not covered by other health insurance programs, including Jamkesda.
Extending the analysis to 2011 might confound the Jamkesda impact estimates.
The Jampersal program was discontinued in 2014 with the introduction of the
national health insurance program (JKN). So far, there is limited evidence of
the effect of Jampersal.7
7Achadi et al. (2014) conducted an assessment of the program in 2 locations – Garut and
Depok – in 2013 and show that even in the third year of implementation, awareness about
the program was low: 30% of the target population, i.e. women of child bearing age, were
not aware of the program in the two districts. Furthermore, provider involvement in the two
districts was low due to dissatisfaction with the fee structure and reimbursement from central
government. There is also evidence of mis-targeting, as the use of Jampersal was higher
among those women which were already covered by insurance. Finally, the study shows that
Jampersal only had effects in Garut where institutional delivery coverage was still low (Achadi
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Table 1 shows descriptive characteristics for the pooled data. Our sample
of children is gender balanced, with a male share of around 51 percent. The
average age of mothers at the birth of the child included in the sample is 28
years, and mothers’ education averages about 9 years. The mothers in the
sample have on average 2.5 children, and 97 percent are married. The sampled
children come from predominantly male headed households with on average 5.5
members. Just over half of the children live in rural areas.
With respect to the district features, we see substantial variation in key
infrastructure characteristics. Over the three PODES surveys, about 62 percent
of households are connected to the electricity grid, 24 percent of villages obtain
drinking water through manual or electric pumps, and 64 percent are accessible
by an asphalt road. With respect to health services, only 42 percent of villages
have a doctor, while midwives and traditional birth assistants are found in 82
and 86 percent of the villages.
The vast majority of the Jamkesda schemes were rolled out between 2007
and 2010, following the introduction and expansion of the national social health
insurance programs for the poor (i.e. Askeskin and subsequently Jamkesmas),
and with the first directly elected district heads having taken office. By 2011 just
over 97 percent of districts in our sample had introduced a Jamkesda scheme
(Figure 2).
The districts also show a large degree of variation in Jamkesda design char-
acteristics (Table 2). About 35 percent of the districts have Jamkesda schemes
that cover prenatal and maternity care services, while 25 percent cover delivery
services. Almost all the districts cover services provided at the local health
centre (92 percent), and district and province/national hospitals (88 respec-
tively 82 percent). Only a quarter also contracted private hospitals, mainly
for referrals. Closing the coverage gap left by national insurance programs and
achieving universal coverage is an objective of about a third of the schemes in
et al. 2014).
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our sample.
Variation in institutional and operational design are discussed in more detail
in Sparrow et al. (2016). They report that membership cards as proof of
eligibility are used in only 26 percent of the districts, while 29 percent of districts
have outsourced management of their Jamkesda program to a private insurer.
The remainder are managed by the DHO, in most cases through special divisions
or technical units. In 20 percent of the districts Jamkesda schemes have been
endorsed by both the district head and the local parliament, which provides the
strongest legal basis for the schemes as these cannot be abolished or amended
without approval from the local parliament.
3.2 Outcome variables
Our empirical analysis of maternal and child health care concentrates on five
measures: the number of antenatal care visits, having at least 4 antenatal
care visits as advised by the World Health Organization (WHO), the place of
delivery (whether a child was born at home), delivery assistance (whether the
birth was attended by a trained professional, a village midwife or doctor), and
the mode of delivery (whether the child was born by caesarian section).8 Before
we explore the effect of the Jamkesda on these outcomes more systematically,
Table 3 provides an overview of the development of these indicators from 2004
to 2010.9
The average number of antenatal visits increases, from an average of just
below 7 visits, by about 0.5 visits between 2004 and 2010. This trend is also
reflected in the share of reported pregnancies for which mothers sought at least
4 antenatal care visits, which increased from 81 to 87 percent. Births at home
declined from 58 percent in 2004 to 39 percent in 2010, while births assisted by
8Ideally we would also look at child and maternal mortality rates. However, the IDHS does
not contain the number of observations and reports of child and maternal mortality required
to provide sufficient statistical power.
9Table A1 in the supplemental appendix shows the evolution of the outcome measures
disaggregated by region and wealth status.
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a trained professional increase from 29 to 46 percent. With an increasing share
of births at a health facility, the number of caesarean sections also increases
from 6 percent in 2004 to 14 percent in 2010.
The antenatal care outcome measures only the frequency of visits. With an
average of more than 4 visits, Indonesia does exceed the minimum standards
set out by the WHO. However, the quality of the antenatal care received is
of particular concern. The Ministry of Health of Indonesia recommends that
quality antenatal care should include the following components: (i) height and
weight measurements, (ii) blood pressure measurement, (iii) iron tablets, (iv)
tetanus toxoid immunization, (v) abdominal examination, (vi) testing of blood
and urine samples and (vii) information on the signs of pregnancy complications.
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for each of the components. For a number of
individual components there is evidence of improvement over time. However, in
2010 for only 14 percent of the children born do mothers report having received
the complete set of recommended services.
4 Empirical Approach
Even though Jamkesda schemes vary in their design, they have common po-
litical and institutional origins. Therefore, we first concentrate on the average
effects of these schemes before investigating the heterogeneity in the design of
these schemes. In order to assess the average effect of the Jamkesda schemes
on maternal and child health care services we use a linear district fixed effects
specification:10
10Linear models could be mis-specified for the binary and censored outcomes. Nevertheless,
we apply a linear specification to control for district fixed effects and to not lose observations
for districts with few DHS observations and limited variation in the outcome variables. We did
estimate fixed effects Poisson (for antenatal care) and logit models (for home births, assisted
deliveries and caesarean sections) as an alternative. These yielded qualitatively similar results.
In addition, we apply the trimmed estimator suggested by Horrace and Oaxaca (2006), who
argue that the potential bias in linear probability models increases with the proportion of
predicted probabilities that falls outside the zero to one interval. They suggest a trimming es-
timator by dropping those observations outside the interval and re-estimating the linear model
for the remaining sample. For the binary outcome variables 82 to 91 percent of predicted prob-
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Yikt = α+ βJamkesdakt−1 +D
′
kt−1γ +X
′
iktθ + δt + µk + εikt (1)
where Yikt represents one of the five outcome variables for child i in district k
at year of birth t.
The main variable of interest is Jamkesdakt−1, which is a dummy variable
indicating whether a district has been operating a local health care financing
scheme in the calendar year prior to the year of birth. We choose this lagged
specification because the specific month in which Jamkesda schemes are intro-
duced varies greatly and for many districts will not overlap with the IDHS recall
period in the same year. Moreover, the use of antenatal care and any percep-
tions or decisions with regard to the mode of delivery and birth assistance are
expected to be determined mostly in the months preceding the birth of a child,
possibly overlapping with the previous calendar year. The coefficient β can be
interpreted as the average impact of the Jamkesda program after controlling
for the coverage effects of an array of national schemes covered by the vector γ.
The district indicators D
′
kt include the share of the district population covered
by each of the following programs: subsidized social health insurance Askeskin
and Jamkesmas, the health card program, public sector health insurance, for-
mal private sector social health insurance, private health insurance and other
schemes. We further control for other basic district characteristics, such as the
share of the population, the level of electrification, the main source of drinking
water, road access, and the availability of trained health staff. The vector X
′
ikt
controls for child-, mother- and household characteristics reported in Table 1.
Time invariant district characteristics are controlled for by including district
fixed effects µk, while δt controls for year fixed effects.
In addition to analysing the average effects of the Jamkesda schemes we
abilities fall within the unit interval, while less than 1 percent of the sample shows predicted
antenatal visits smaller than zero. Finally, the Horrace and Oaxaca trimmed estimator yields
similar coefficients to the linear regressions for the unrestricted sample. Therefore, we present
linear probability models in the paper.
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probe the heterogeneity in design characteristics S that relate to the popula-
tion and service coverage dimensions of the Universal Health Coverage (UHC)
framework (World Health Organization, 2010):
Yikt = α+ βJamkesdakt−1 + S
′
kt−1λ+D
′
kt−1γ +X
′
iktθ + δt + µk + εikt (2)
The vector Skt−1 includes a dummy variable indicating if the program objective
is to cover all the non-insured or not, the maternal health services covered by
the benefit packages (antenatal care and delivery assistance) of the district
schemes, and the type of providers contracted. Note that by design Skt−1 = 0
if Jamkesdakt−1 = 0.
Equations (1) and (2) will yield unbiased estimates of Jamkesda in the
absence of unobserved confounding factors. The district fixed effects eliminate
any time invariant factors such as topography, institutions and endowments,
while inclusion of individual and district level characteristics should minimize
bias due to time variant omitted variables.
The main confounding factor that we do not control for in equations (1)
and (2) is potential change in district public policy that coincides with the
introduction of the Jamkesda schemes. Policy reforms are rarely isolated events
and it is not unlikely that local health care financing initiatives are part of a
larger reform agenda of local governments. In the specific case of the Jamkesda,
indeed, Sparrow et al. (2016) show that the timing of local elections are a
strong predictor of the timing of introducing Jamkesda. If these elections led
to broader reforms then they may influence the outcome variables other than
through Jamkesda. We test for this source of violation of the parallel trends
assumption by including a dummy variable indicating whether a district has a
directly elected mayor or regent in the year of birth t. The timing of the first
direct elections for district heads differs per district as they are determined by
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the time of expiry of the appointed incumbents’ term in office after 2005. This
provides identifying variation over time and across districts. If our estimates
are confounded by the influence of local elections and multiple policy reforms,
then the results are expected to be sensitive to including the direct election
variable.
To further investigate the presence of non-parallel trends, we estimate placebo
regressions where we assess correlation between the outcome variables and next
year’s adoption of a Jamkesda scheme. These regressions are identical to Equa-
tion (1) except that we include Jamkesdakt+1 instead of Jamkesdakt−1. Statis-
tical significance of the β coefficients would be evidence of confounding trends.
Moreover, we also test whether the estimated effects are driven by fertility
delays in expectation of the introduction of a Jamkesda scheme (see Table A2
for detailed results).11
Finally, we address the potential sample selection bias due to the non-
response in the DHO survey (see Table A3). Although it is not necessarily
our aim to generalize the results beyond the 58 percent of the Indonesian pop-
ulation that is covered by our data, we do want to get a sense of the extent
to which our results are sensitive to the non-response. We estimate a selection
probit for the probability that a child observed in the IDHS sub-sample lives
in a district that is also covered by the DHO survey. An inverse Mills ratio is
constructed from these estimates and included as an additional control variable
in the district fixed effects regression. The probit includes the same D
′
kt and
X
′
ikt control variables as in Equation (1), which are available for all districts
irrespective of DHO survey response. To support identification of the selection
model, we include the DHO survey enumerator fixed effects for each district as
an additional explanatory variable in the selection equation. We argue that the
enumerator interview skills may influence the DHO non-response probability,
while there is no reason to expect that these skills are related to the outcome
11We do not find any systematic influence of the schemes, neither on desired fertility nor
on actual births.
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variables in the IDHS surveys of 2007 and 2012.12
5 Results
Table 5 presents the average effects of the Jamkesda scheme based on the econo-
metric specifications described above. Column (1) shows the β coefficients for
the different outcome variables in the base specification without covariates, col-
umn (2) shows the coefficients controlling for year fixed effects and individual
characteristics, and column (3) is the full specification that also accounts for
district characteristics. Columns (4) and (5) present estimates that are sensitive
to the timing of local elections and sample selection, respectively.
The results in column (1) show that there is a positive correlation between
the presence of a Jamkesda scheme and maternal care. That is, the number
of antenatal care visits and the probability of receiving professionally trained
birth assistance are higher, and the probability of delivering at home is lower
in the presence of Jamkesda. However, this association seems to be mostly
spurious correlation or driven by selection effects. As we add year fixed effects
and control variables the correlation becomes weaker, especially when household
characteristics are included.
The results in column (3) suggest that on average, the introduction of the
Jamkesda schemes led to an increase in antenatal care utilization of 0.26 visits.
Although this seems small compared to the level of utilization, as it is about 4
percent of the average number of visits in 2004, it is still about half of the total
increase in antenatal care observed between 2004 and 2010. While the effect on
antenatal care is positive, we find no statistically significant effect on exceeding
the 4-visit threshold. There are also no substantial effects of Jamkesda on home
deliveries, births assisted by a trained professional or birth by caesarean section.
12The enumerators were assigned as primary contact to a specific set of districts, with non-
response rates per enumerator varying from 19 to 65 percent. There is no purposive spatial
pattern in district allocation to enumerators, as each enumerator covered various regions of
Indonesia to share the burden of long distance connection problems and different time zones
within the team.
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The coefficients are small compared to the initial correlation shown in column
(1) and imprecise.
The sensitivity analysis, columns (4) and (5), show that the estimates are
robust, strengthening the interpretation of the results of the main specification
(column (3)) as causal effects. We find no evidence of confounding policy ef-
fects through directly elected district heads, as the results reported in column
(4) and column (3) are marginally different for all outcomes. Moreover, the
placebo regressions show no evidence of other non-parallel trends. The coeffi-
cients for Jamkesdakt+1 are very small and not statistically significant (column
(6)).13 The results are also not sensitive to including the sample selection term
that corrects for the DHO survey non-response (column (5)). The enumera-
tor fixed effects appear strong predictors of sample selection, yet the results
in columns (3) and (5) are almost identical.14 This suggests that any differ-
ences between the sampled and non-response districts have been absorbed by
the control variables and the district fixed effects.
Previous research has indicated that different regions in Indonesia are ex-
posed to different health problems (UNICEF 2012). We therefore investigate
the heterogeneity of the Jamkesda effects with respect to the rural-urban divide
and across regions (i.e. Java and Bali compared to other islands). Due to the
large number of results from this combination of outcome variables and sub-
populations, we incorporated multiple hypothesis testing to reduce the proba-
bility of falsely rejecting the null. We calculated adjusted p-values that account
for potential correlation between the outcome variables, following the step-
down procedure proposed by Romano and Wolf (2016). The results presented
in Table 6 indicate that the increase in antenatal care visits is mainly driven
by increased access on Java and Bali, relatively populous and wealthy islands
compared to other regions.15 This effect for Java and Bali is sufficiently strong
13The placebo regression results for all outcomes and sub-populations are reported in the
supplemental appendix (see Tables A4 and A5).
14Detailed estimates are provided in the supplemental appendix (see Table A3).
15Each coefficient in Table 6 reflects the β coefficient of a separate regression. The clustered
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that we also find a statistically significant increase in the incidence of having
at least four visits and meeting the WHO standard.16 The density, quality and
variety of health care providers is greatest on these islands, and this may have
been important for facilitating the effects of health insurance.17 In contrast,
access to antenatal care is less accessible and a more prominent policy concern
for the other islands in the archipelago, but it is for these islands that we find
no evidence of any effects. This is an important shortcoming of the Jamkesda
schemes. For the other outcome variables we observe no region-specific differ-
ences.
Given that many Jamkesda schemes were motivated partly by the coverage
gaps in the national insurance schemes, we also assess effect heterogeneity by
wealth status. The last four columns of Table 6 shows regression results per
wealth quartile. The increase in number of antenatal care visits is pronounced
among the third quartile of the wealth distribution, and remains statistically
significant when we apply the Romano-Wolf correction. This result coincides
with the target population of most Jamkesda schemes, as this group is not
expected to be eligible for subsidized social health insurance programs, while
at the same time likely to be active in the informal sector and lacking access
to formal sector health insurance. The estimated effect for the third quartile is
sizable and accounts for the total increase in antenatal care observed for this
group between 2004 and 2010.18 We observe a similar effect for births at home.
While we do not find a statistically significant effect for the full population, we
do see a strong negative effect for the third quartile. The size of this effect is
also still considerable, with the decrease in home births accounting for about
standard errors are reported together with the Romano-Wolf p-values.
16The estimated effect on the number of antenatal care visits for Java and Bali is statistically
different from the effect for the other islands (p-value 0.087).
17Including the supply of health care providers in the regression does not return meaningful
results. The distribution of health care providers does not tend to vary much over time and
any explanatory variation is likely absorbed by the district fixed effects. However, we cannot
exclude that the results obtained are driven by the institutional quality of the health care
system in Java/Bali, which is something we don’t observe.
18The estimated effect for quartile 3 is statistically different from the effect for quartile 2
and 4 (p-values 0.09 and 0.03, respectively) but not different from quartile 1.
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one third of the decrease observed for this quartile over time or about 16 percent
of the 2004 average (see Table A1 in the supplemental appendix).19
Turning to the type of services provided during antenatal care visits we see
that the Jamkesda schemes are associated with a 4 percentage point increase
(roughly 16 to 23 percent of average annual service provision) in the provision
of basic recommended antenatal services (Table 7). This would represent a
substantial increase over time, since during the period from 2004 to 2010 basic
recommended services increased by 8 percentage points (see Table 4). However,
while the clustered standard errors suggest that this effect is statistically signif-
icant, it does not pass the scrutiny of the Romano-Wolf p-values. But if we look
beyond the national average, we do find results for sub-populations that stand
up to multiple hypothesis testing. Consistent with the increase in the number
of antenatal visits, the effect on the provision of basic recommended antenatal
services is observed mainly for the third quartile and rural areas. For the other
islands the impact estimate is also statistically significant, but slightly smaller.
We find no evidence that the Jamkesda are associated with an increase in the
share of pregnant women that receive a complete set of recommended services.
In addition, for none of the individual type of services do we find Romano-Wolf
p-values below 0.1. We therefore omit these from Table 7.20
To conclude, the effects of the Jamkesda schemes seem predominantly easily
obtained gains, observed for services where barriers to (additional) utilization
are already relatively low: with antenatal care, the depth of services provided
during antenatal care visits, and women that would have opted for birth assis-
tance from trained professionals now choosing to give birth at a facility rather
than at home. In contrast, the results also seem to correspond with the pre-
vailing perception in Indonesia that the incidence of births at home without
professional assistance (i.e. predominantly births attended by traditional mid-
19The estimated effect for quartile 3 is statistically different from the effect for quartile 1
and 4 (p-values 0.001 and 0.006, respectively) but not different from quartile 2.
20The complete set of results are provided in the supplemental appendix (see Tables A7-A9).
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wives) is persistent and not particularly sensitive to policy interventions. Even
with the expansion of births at health facilities, home births attended by tradi-
tional birth attendants, who have helped deliver previous generations within the
family, are still preferred particularly in rural areas. According to qualitative
evidence from our own fieldwork and also anecdotal evidence from other studies
of maternal health in Indonesia, there is still a lack of trust in the professional
village midwives (World Bank 2013). People have, for example, reported that
they prefer to call the traditional birth attendant who is an integral part of the
village rather than disturbing the village midwife. Also, often the use of the
village midwife is associated with higher costs as compared to the traditional
birth attendant, who is usually not formally reimbursed or reimbursed in kind
(World Bank 2013).
The influence of the Jamkesda schemes’ design characteristics on maternal
care outcomes are presented in Table 8. The benefits packages seem to affect
the utilization of maternal care. Including prenatal and maternity care in the
benefit package has a positive and statistically significant effect on the number
of antenatal care visits but not on having at least four visits.21 Schemes that
cover costs of delivery assistance are associated with a reduction in births at
home and an increasing likelihood of births being attended by a skilled pro-
fessional and birth by caesarean section, but these estimates are not precise.
Including the benefits packages in the specification renders the Jamkesda coeffi-
cient statistically insignificant. This implies that the Jamkesda effect emanates
entirely from the district schemes that have given greater priority to antenatal
and delivery services. While perhaps an obvious point, it also suggests that
such services need to be included in benefit packages if such schemes purport
to influence maternal health outcomes.22
21It also has a positive effect on the probability of receiving the basic recommended antenatal
care services.
22Including the benefits packages in the specification on the specific antenatal care services,
i.e. weight and height measurement, blood pressure measurement, blood and urine samples,
iron tablets, tetanus toxoid immunization and information on pregnancy complications also
renders the Jamkesda coefficient insignificant and shows that the effects are entirely driven
22
Variation in health care provider contracting shows mixed results. Includ-
ing coverage at village health centres is associated with more antenatal care,
which is a service that is typically offered in these centres or offered by providers
that are directly related to the community centres, such as village midwives.
However, while the coefficient is large, so are the standard errors, and the es-
timates are statistically insignificant. Village health centres are less inclined
to deliver by caesarean section, for which we see a statistically significant de-
crease. Contracting district hospitals also seems to favour antenatal care, as
well as reducing births at home. However, once again the effect on antenatal
care is not precise. For contracts with provincial and national hospital we see
a different result, as this reduces the Jamkesda impacts on both antenatal care
visits and professional assistance at birth. Referrals to higher level hospitals
are not (or rarely) expected to involve antenatal care or deliveries. In addition,
maternal care providers such as village midwives or maternity centres are part
of local health systems and networks in which village health centres and dis-
trict hospitals have a key coordinating role. Contracting higher level providers
such as province and national hospitals is likely to shift resources away from
these networks and weaken the link of Jamkesda schemes with maternal care
providers, and perhaps reduces it’s impact on maternal care. Finally, we see no
effect of contracting private providers.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, schemes that aim to completely fill the coverage
gap are less effective in increasing antenatal care, suggesting that the ambition
of universal coverage is often beyond the means of district budgets and spreads
resources too thinly, which may outweigh the effect of expanding insurance
coverage.
by schemes which cover maternal care services. The results are not shown but available from
the authors upon request.
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6 Conclusion
We investigated the effect of local, district level health care financing schemes
– collectively known as Jamkesda – on access and utilization of maternal care
in Indonesia. The district pseudo-panel and district fixed effects identification
strategy used in this paper yields causal evidence and contributes to the thus
far mainly cross-section based empirical literature which has investigated the
effect of health care financing policies on maternal health care. Furthermore,
decentralized public health policy in Indonesia, and the subsequent variation
in health financing across districts, allowed us to investigate differences in the
design of these different schemes within a single country context.
Overall, we found limited effects of the Jamkesda on maternal care, in the
sense that these schemes only affect antenatal care services but not in-facility
births or assisted births. Despite the already high level of antenatal care visits,
the local health care financing schemes contributed to an increase in antenatal
care utilization by 0.26 visits, which is four percent of average utilization but
about half of the total increase observed between 2004 and 2010. Furthermore,
we also found evidence that the Jamkesda contributed to improvements in the
depth of antenatal care. The Jamkesda led to a four percentage point increase
in the use of basic recommended antenatal care services. This effect is sizeable
because quality of antenatal care services is still low and in 2010 only 27 per-
cent of the women reported that they had received the full minimum service
package comprising of measurement of weight, height, blood pressure and the
testing of urine and blood samples. Thus, the findings suggest that local health
care financing schemes indeed reduce financial barriers to access antenatal care
services. However, they also suggest that for deliveries, considerations other
than financial, play an important role, with customs and trust being impor-
tant aspects that need to be overcome in order to increase the number of birth
assisted by a trained professional. With the increase in the use of basic rec-
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ommended services the local schemes also seem to contribute to improving the
depth of ante natal services provided, potentially due to the secured payment
and reimbursement which the schemes provide.
The Jamkesda schemes have to some extent been able to address the “miss-
ing middle” coverage gaps in the national social insurance schemes. Disaggre-
gating the results by wealth shows that the positive effects on antenatal care
utilization emanate from households in the third quartile of the wealth distribu-
tion. For this group we also saw a decline in home births due to the Jamkesda.
These effects for households in the third quartile suggests that the local health
care financing schemes helped close the coverage gap as this group was unlikely
to be covered by the subsidized social health insurance for the poor, while at the
same time also unlikely to benefit from formal sector health insurance. Looking
into the different features of the district schemes, we saw that the overall effect
of the Jamkesda was mainly driven by schemes that explicitly cover antenatal
care. This suggests that health insurance schemes might not have an effect on
maternal care unless such services are covered in the benefit package.
The heterogeneity in both scheme design and estimation results provide
some insight on the limitations of local schemes. The overall effect of increased
access to antenatal care is mainly driven by increased access on Java and Bali,
where the density and variety of health care providers and arguably also the
institutional quality and capacity of the health care system is higher. However,
we found no effects for the other islands, where access to antenatal care is a
more pressing concern. Schemes that aimed for full population coverage or
that contracted national and provincial providers of more advanced medical
care, were less effective in improving maternal care. These results suggest that
districts are limited in local resources and risk pools to offer the full breadth
of services to a larger target population. The effectiveness of Jamkesda can be
further constrained by limited human resources and administrative capacity at
the district level, and in the supply and quality of local health care.
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Our findings highlight potential risks for the JKN – the new national health
insurance scheme in Indonesia. First, previous studies on the Jampersal have
stressed that beneficiaries need to be aware of the services on offer and their
entitlements (see e.g. Achadi et al. 2014). Local governments in this context
might be able to play a role in increasing local awareness. Likewise, the local
health care financing schemes could be used to motivate particularly those en-
gaged in the informal sector to voluntarily enrol in the national scheme. This
is of primary importance given that voluntary enrolment in the JKN is still low
(see Sato and Damayanti 2015) and the government is still pursuing the goal of
reaching universal health insurance coverage by 2019. The local schemes could
play an important role towards reaching this objective. However, within the
current context, it still remains to be seen how these schemes will be used and
integrated by 2019.
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Figures
Figure 1: Coverage of the district survey
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Figure 2: Expansion of Jamkesda schemes over time
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual data and district characteristics
Mean SD
Panel A: Individual level data (IDHS; N=10,856)
Child male (=1) 0.51
Birth order 2.36 1.58
Recall period of birth (months) 29.48 15.24
Mother age at birth (years) 27.93 6.24
Mother years of education 8.89 4
Married (=1) 0.97 0.18
Number of children born 2.5
Rural (=1) 0.58 0.49
Head male (=1) 0.93
Number of HH members 5.46 2.2
Quartile 1, poorest (=1) 0.21
Quartile 2 0.25
Quartile 3 0.26
Quartile 4, wealthiest (=1) 0.28
Panel B: District information (PODES, SUSENAS; N=2000)
% subsidized SHI 0.14 0.16
% formal sector SHI 0.1 0.07
% private HI 0.05 0.09
% other HI 0.01 0.02
% of electrified HH in district 0.62 0.27
% of villages with water from pump 0.24 0.26
% of villages with water from well 0.47 0.28
% of villages with asphalt road 0.64 0.27
% of villages with male village head 0.96 0.05
% of villages with doctor 0.43 0.34
% of villages with midwife 0.82 0.17
% of villages with traditional birth assistant 0.86 0.2
Notes: Standard deviations are not reported for binary variables.
Source: IDHS (2007, 2012), SUSENAS (2003-2009), PODES (2003, 2006, 2008).
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Table 2: Design characteristics of Jamkesda schemes
Percent of districts
Service coverage
Antenatal care 34.6
Delivery assistance 23.9
Provider characteristics
Village health centre 91.9
District public hospital 88.0
Province or national public hospital 81.6
Hospital in other district or province 40.6
Private hospital 25.2
Population coverage
Universal coverage as objective 32.9
Source: DHO survey 2011/2012. The table shows characteristics for
the DHO survey subsample of 234 districts that also appear in the
IDHS 2007 and 2012 surveys.
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Table 3: Evolution of outcome measures over time
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of antenatal care visits 6.8 6.68 6.7 6.83 7.45 7.38 7.3
4+ antenatal care visits (=1) 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.89 0.88 0.87
Delivery at home (=1) 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.4 0.39
Birth assisted by trained professional (=1) 0.29 0.3 0.32 0.59 0.41 0.43 0.46
Caesarean (=1) 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14
Source: IDHS (2007, 2012).
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Table 4: Antenatal services received and evolution over time
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Weight measurement (=1) 0.69 0.81 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.79 0.85
Height measurement (=1) 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.48 0.5 0.47
Blood pressure measurement (=1) 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.95
Testing of blood and urine samples (=1) 0.4 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.47 0.47 0.44
Iron tablets (=1) 0.8 0.78 0.8 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.74
Tetanus toxoid immunization (=1) 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.76
Information of signs of pregnancy complications (=1) 0.41 0.39 0.4 0.44 0.55 0.54 0.53
Basic recommended services a) (=1) 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.28 0.27
Complete set of recommended services received (=1) 0.1 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.13 0.15 0.14
Notes: Data on abdominal examinations is not consistently available in the DHS survey rounds. a) Basic
recommended services include measurement of weight, height and blood pressure, and testing of blood and
urine samples.
Source: IDHS (2007, 2012).
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Table 5: Effect of the Jamkesda schemes (N=10,856 across 234 districts)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Mean
Number of antenatal care visits 0.679** 0.210 0.260* 0.255+ 0.251+ -0.030 7.02
(0.114) (0.140) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.124)
4+ antenatal care visits (=1) 0.070** 0.023 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.023 0.84
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Delivery at home (=1) -0.119** -0.028 -0.019 -0.017 -0.018 -0.002 0.47
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014)
Birth assisted by trained professional (=1) 0.038+ -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 0.42
(0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020)
Caesarean (=1) 0.065** 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.020 -0.011 0.10
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Controls
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies, household characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Direct elections district regent/mayor No No No Yes No No
Sample selection term No No No No Yes No
Notes: Control variables omitted for convenience. Column (6) reports placebo regression results. Standard errors
clustered at district level in parenthesis.
Statistical significance: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10.
Source: IDHS (2007, 2012), SUSENAS (2003-2009), PODES (2003, 2006, 2008), DHO survey 2011/2012.
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Table 6: Effect of the Jamkesda schemes by rural/urban locations, region and wealth quartile
Rural Urban Java & Other Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Bali islands (poorest) (wealthiest)
Number of antenatal care visits 0.168 0.229 0.657* 0.089 0.413 0.023 0.590* -0.046
(0.180) (0.208) (0.300) (0.150) (0.350) (0.245) (0.244) (0.205)
[0.579] [0.465] [0.058] [0.705] [0.465] [0.914] [0.094] [0.903]
4+ antenatal care visits (=1) 0.030 0.015 0.058+ 0.011 0.057 0.015 0.059* -0.016
(0.025) (0.021) (0.030) (0.020) (0.051) (0.030) (0.029) (0.019)
[0.503] [0.698] [0.061] [0.698] [0.503] [0.698] [0.142] [0.698]
Delivery at home (=1) -0.024 0.017 0.003 -0.020 0.043 -0.034 -0.084** 0.022
(0.027) (0.025) (0.036) (0.023) (0.030) (0.036) (0.032) (0.027)
[0.671] [0.676] [0.923] [0.656] [0.613] [0.676] [0.046] [0.676]
Birth assisted by trained professional (=1) -0.026 -0.007 0.029 -0.026 -0.038 0.004 0.022 0.019
(0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.029) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.039)
[0.780] [0.918] [0.820] [0.773] [0.780] [0.919] [0.875] [0.875]
Caesarean (=1) 0.009 0.029 0.041 0.008 0.008 -0.025 0.042 0.052+
(0.017) (0.021) (0.032) (0.014) (0.016) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
[0.740] [0.413] [0.402] [0.740] [0.740] [0.582] [0.384] [0.374]
Number of observations 6,318 4,538 3,369 7,487 2,324 2,671 2,847 3,014
Notes: Specification similar to column (3) of Table 5. Control variables include demographic and household characteristics, district characteris-
tics, and district fixed effects. Control variables omitted for convenience. Standard errors clustered at district level in parenthesis. Romano-Wolf
(2016) multiple hypothesis test p-values, based on regression results in each row, in square brackets (1,000 replications).
Statistical significance: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10.
Source: IDHS (2007, 2012), SUSENAS (2003-2009), PODES (2003, 2006, 2008), DHO survey 2011/2012.
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Table 7: Effect of the Jamkesda schemes on quality of antenatal care by rural/urban locations, region and wealth quartile
All Rural Urban Java & Other Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Bali islands (poorest) (wealthiest)
Basic recommended services (=1) 0.043+ 0.073* 0.016 0.082+ 0.020 -0.012 -0.023 0.112* 0.041
(0.024) (0.034) (0.038) (0.048) (0.028) (0.050) (0.052) (0.045) (0.050)
[0.258] [0.077] [0.813] [0.235] [0.753] [0.813] [0.813] [0.077] [0.749]
Complete set of rec. services (=1) -0.007 0.014 -0.016 0.002 -0.011 -0.031 -0.026 0.013 0.004
(0.020) (0.025) (0.033) (0.038) (0.022) (0.039) (0.034) (0.035) (0.042)
[0.786] [0.900] [0.906] [0.955] [0.906] [0.872] [0.900] [0.906] [0.952]
Number of observations 10,856 6,318 4,538 3,369 7,487 2,324 2,671 2,847 3,014
Notes: Specification similar to column (3) of Table 5. Control variables include demographic and household characteristics, district characteris-
tics, and district fixed effects. Control variables omitted for convenience. Standard errors clustered at district level in parenthesis. Romano-Wolf
(2016) multiple hypothesis test p-values, based on regression results in each row, in square brackets (1,000 replications). Basic recommended
services include measurement of weight, height and blood pressure, and testing of blood and urine samples. The complete set of recommended
services additionally includes providing iron tablets, tetanus toxoid immunization, and information on pregnancy complications.
Statistical significance: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10.
Source: IDHS (2007, 2012), SUSENAS (2003-2009), PODES (2003, 2006, 2008), DHO survey 2011/2012.
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Table 8: Effect of Jamkesda design characteristics
Number of ANC 4+ ANC Delivery at Birth ass. by Caesarean
visits visits home trained prof.
Jamkesda (=1) 0.056 0.082 0.001 0.017 0.137*
(0.588) (0.071) (0.064) (0.094) (0.063)
Service coverage
Antenatal care (=1) 0.754* 0.037 0.048 -0.024 -0.034
(0.294) (0.0380 (0.040) (0.042) (0.021)
Delivery assistance (=1) -0.221 0.004 -0.077 0.059 0.030
(0.317) (0.042) (0.050) (0.056) (0.025)
Provider characteristics
Village health centre (=1) 0.370 -0.031 0.023 0.009 -0.099+
(0.437) (0.037) (0.052) (0.059) (0.059)
Dist. pub. hospital (=1) 0.458 0.053 -0.114* 0.077 0.027
(0.343) (0.052) (0.048) (0.075) (0.035)
Prov./nat. publ. hospital (=1) -0.726* -0.0802+ 0.060 -0.102* -0.038
(0.316) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.031)
Hospital in other dist./prov. (=1) 0.112 0.034 0.019 0.005 -0.004
(0.198) (0.023) (0.031) (0.042) (0.024)
Private hospital (=1) -0.089 -0.036 0.012 -0.033 -0.029
(0.210) (0.024) (0.031) (0.042) (0.026)
Further characteristics
Universal coverage (=1) -0.614** -0.070* -0.015 -0.018 0.007
(0.235) (0.035) (0.031) (0.044) (0.020)
Controls
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies, HH char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,135 9,135 10,761 7,490 10,776
Adjusted R-squared 0.144 0.092 0.162 0.131 0.054
Notes: Control variables omitted for convenience. Standard errors clustered at district level in parenthesis.
Statistical significance: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10.
Source: IDHS (2007, 2012), SUSENAS (2003-2009), PODES (2003, 2006, 2008), DHO survey 2011/2012.
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